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ABSTRACT In this review article, we explore several recent
advances in the quantitative modeling of financial markets. We
begin with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and describe how
this controversial idea has stimulated a number of new directions
of research, some focusing on more elaborate mathematical
models that are capable of rationalizing the empirical facts,
others taking a completely different tack in rejecting rationality
altogether. One of the most promising directions is to view
financial markets from a biological perspective and, specifically,
within an evolutionary framework in which markets, instru-
ments, institutions, and investors interact and evolve dynami-
cally according to the ‘‘law’’ of economic selection. Under this
view, financial agents compete and adapt, but they do not
necessarily do so in an optimal fashion. Evolutionary and
ecological models of financial markets is truly a new frontier
whose exploration has just begun.
If, in January, 1926, an individual invested $1 in one-month U.S.
Treasury bills—one of the safest securities in the world—and
continued reinvesting the proceeds month by month until De-
cember, 1996, the original investment would have grown to $14.
If, on the other hand, an individual invested $1 in the S&P 500—a
much riskier investment—over the same 71-year period, this
investment would have grown to $1,370, a considerably larger
sum. Now suppose that, each month, an individual were able to
divine in advance which of these two investments would yield a
higher return for that month and took advantage of this infor-
mation by switching the running total of his initial $1 investment
into the higher-yielding asset. What would a $1 investment in such
a ‘‘perfect foresight’’ investment strategy become by December
1996?
The startling answer is $2,296,183,456, more than two billion
dollars!§ Despite the fact that perfect foresight in financial
markets is impossible, this example suggests that even a modest
ability to forecast financial asset returns may be handsomely
rewarded. Of course, there are considerable risks involved. As
recent financial calamities such as that of Long Term Capital
Management have made very clear, it is also possible to lose very
large sums of money. Financial markets are very difficult to
predict; otherwise, we would all be rich. One of the central
questions, indeed, perhaps the most central question in finance,
is, “Under what circumstances is prediction possible at all?”
In this review article, we explore this issue in light of recent
advances in the quantitative modeling of financial markets. The
potent combination of breakthroughs in financial technology and
computational speed and efficiency is creating an exciting renais-
sance in financial research, both inside and outside the halls of
academia. It is impossible for us to provide a complete survey of
these developments here; instead, we focus on the beginnings of
a new research direction that the emerging fields of computa-
tional finance and financial engineering may be heading toward—
evolutionary and ecological models of financial markets—and
how these new perspectives may be changing fundamental views
about market prediction.
Our starting point is the ‘‘Efficient Markets Hypothesis’’
(EMH), a powerful idea that can be traced back to Paul Sam-
uelson (1), whose contribution is neatly summarized by the title
of his article: ‘‘Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate
Randomly.’’ In an informationally efficient market, price changes
must be unforecastable if they are properly anticipated, i.e., if they
fully incorporate the expectations and information of all market
participants.
This concept of informational efficiency has a wonderfully
counterintuitive and seemingly contradictory flavor to it: the
more efficient the market, the more random the sequence of price
changes generated by such a market must be, and the most
efficient market of all is one in which price changes are completely
random and unpredictable. This, of course, is not an accident of
nature but is the direct outcome of many active participants
attempting to profit from their information. Unable to curtail
their greed, an army of investors aggressively pounce on even the
smallest informational advantages at their disposal, and, in doing
so, they incorporate their information into market prices and
quickly eliminate the profit opportunities that gave rise to their
actions. If this occurs instantaneously, which it must in an
idealized world of ‘‘frictionless’’ markets and costless trading,
then prices must always fully reflect all available information, and
no profits can be garnered from information-based trading
(because such profits have already been captured).
But one of the central tenets of modern financial economics is
the necessity of some trade-off between risk and expected return.
If a security’s expected price change is positive, it may be just the
reward needed to attract investors to hold the asset and bear the
corresponding risks. Indeed, if an investor is sufficiently risk
averse, he might gladly pay to avoid holding a security that has
unforecastable returns. In such a world, prices do not need to be
perfectly random, even if markets are operating efficiently and
rationally.
Indeed, several statistical studies have made it clear that prices
are, in fact, not completely random (see, for example, ref. 2).
Economists disagree on whether this represents a violation of
efficient markets. Similarly, the sustained profits of some invest-
ment companies and certain high-profile portfolio managers
seem to challenge the very foundations of market rationality and
efficiency. Are they just lucky? Are they merely receiving appro-
priate compensation for risk? Or are markets simply inefficient?
Such questions have proved to be difficult to answer and remain
controversial.
PNAS is available online at www.pnas.org.
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One of the reasons for this state of affairs is the fact that the
EMH, by itself, is not a well posed and empirically refutable
hypothesis. To make it operational, one must specify additional
structure: e.g., investors’ preferences, information structure, etc.
But then a test of the EMH becomes a test of several auxiliary
hypotheses as well, and a rejection of such a joint hypothesis tells
us little about which aspect of the joint hypothesis is inconsistent
with the data. Moreover, new statistical tests designed to distin-
guish among them will no doubt require auxiliary hypotheses of
their own that, in turn, may be questioned. The hypothesis that
investors are fully rational agents that instantaneously and cor-
rectly process all available information is clearly unrealistic—
rationality is difficult to define, human behavior is often unpre-
dictable, information can be difficult to interpret, technology and
institutions change constantly, and there are significant ‘‘friction-
al’’ costs to gathering and processing information and transacting.
But how can we take all of the complexities of the real world into
account?
One new direction is to treat the EMH as an idealization that
provides a useful reference point. For example, one can ask about
the relative efficiency of markets with respect to each other: e.g.,
futures vs. spot markets, auction vs. dealer markets, etc. The
advantages of the concept of relative efficiency, as opposed to the
all-or-nothing notion of absolute efficiency, are easy to spot by
way of an analogy to the concept of efficiency as used in physics.
Heat engines can be given an efficiency rating based on the
fraction of available energy that they convert into useful work. A
refrigerator with an efficiency of 40% might be considered quite
good, and a buyer would prefer this to one with an efficiency of
only 35%. No one would ever expect 100% efficiency. The best
measure of the relative efficiency of financial markets, relative to
each other, is a topic on the frontiers of research in finance.
Another point of view is to extend the definition of efficient
markets so that consistent profits are possible to those who
acquire a competitive advantage. The motivation for this becomes
apparent from applying the classical version of the EMH to a
nonfinancial context, such as a biotechnology firm attempting to
develop a vaccine for the AIDS virus. If the market for biotech-
nology is efficient in the classical EMH sense, such a vaccine can
never be developed—if it could, someone would have already
done it! This is clearly an absurd conclusion because it ignores the
challenges and gestation lags of research and development in
biotechnology. If a pharmaceutical company does succeed in
developing such a vaccine, the profits earned might be measured
in the billions of dollars—would this be considered ‘‘excess’’
profits or simply an appropriate economic reward for competence
and innovation? Financial markets should not be different in
principle, only in degree. The profits that accrue to an investment
professional need not be a market inefficiency but may simply be
the fair reward for unusual skill, extraordinary effort, or for
breakthroughs in financial technology.
What, then, can we conclude about the EMH? Amazingly,
there is still no consensus among financial economists. Despite
the many advances in the statistical analysis, databases, and
theoretical models surrounding the EMH, the main effect has
been to harden the resolve of the proponents on each side.
However, the controversy surrounding the EMH has stimu-
lated a number of new directions of research, some focusing on
more elaborate mathematical models that are capable of ratio-
nalizing the empirical facts, others taking a completely different
tack in rejecting rationality altogether. We think one of the most
promising directions is to view financial markets from a biological
perspective and, specifically, within an evolutionary framework in
which markets, instruments, institutions, and investors interact
and evolve dynamically according to the ‘‘law’’ of economic
selection. Under this view, financial agents compete and adapt,
but they do not necessarily do so in an optimal fashion.
The desire to build financial theories based on more realistic
assumptions has led to several new strands of literature, including
psychological approaches to risk-taking behavior (3–5), evolu-
tionary game theory (6), and agent-based modeling of financial
markets (ref. 7; N. Chan, B. LeBaron, A.L., and T. Poggio,
unpublished work). Although substantially different in methods
and style, these emerging subfields are all directed at new
interpretations of the EMH. In particular, psychological models
of financial markets focus on the manner in which human
psychology influences the economic decision-making process as
an explanation of apparent departures from rationality. Evolu-
tionary game theory studies the evolution and steady-state equi-
libria of populations of competing strategies in highly idealized
settings. Agent-based models are meant to capture complex
learning behavior and dynamics in financial markets by using
more realistic markets, strategies, and information structures.
For example, in one agent-based model of the financial markets
(J.D.F., unpublished work), the market is modeled by using a
nonequilibrium market mechanism whose simplicity makes it
possible to obtain analytic results while maintaining a plausible
degree of realism. Market participants are treated as computa-
tional entities that employ strategies based on limited informa-
tion. Through their (sometimes suboptimal) actions, they make
profits or losses. Profitable strategies accumulate capital with the
passage of time, and unprofitable strategies lose money and may
eventually disappear. A financial market can thus be viewed as a
coevolving ecology of trading strategies. The strategy is analogous
to a biological species, and the total capital deployed by agents
following a given strategy is analogous to the population of that
species. The creation of new strategies may alter the profitability
of preexisting strategies, in some cases replacing them or driving
them extinct.
Although agent-based models are still in their infancy, the
simulations and related theory have already demonstrated an
ability to understand many aspects of financial markets. Several
studies indicate that, as the population of strategies evolve, the
market tends to become more efficient, but this is far from the
perfect efficiency of the classical EMH. Prices fluctuate in time
with internal dynamics caused by the interaction of diverse
trading strategies. Prices do not necessarily reflect ‘‘true values’’;
if we view the market as a machine whose job is to set prices
properly, the inefficiency of this machine can be substantial.
Patterns in the price tend to disappear as agents evolve profitable
strategies to exploit them, but this occurs only over an extended
period of time, during which substantial profits may be accumu-
lated and new patterns may appear.
Thomas Malthus and Adam Smith—two of the forefathers of
modern economics—were both cited by Darwin as inspirations
for the principle of natural selection, and analogies between
economics and biology have been discussed for more than a
century. However, a quantitative foundation for this approach has
been slow to develop. Recent research in finance suggests that this
is about to change (5). Although there are obvious differences
between evolution in biological systems and evolution in financial
systems, there are also many similarities. The theory of evolution
may prove to be as powerful an idea in finance as it has been in
biology. There is no lack of quantitative data, and there are many
opportunities for biological principles to be applied to financial
interactions—after all, financial institutions are uniquely human
inventions that provide an adaptive advantage to our species. This
is truly a new frontier whose exploration has just begun.
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